Abstract
Introduction
With the development of the Internet technology and the popularization of the e-commerce in the field of personal consumption, phishing has by far become the most dangerous form of fraud to hit online business. By masquerading as a trustworthy entity, phishing is a criminally fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information. In order to avoid these deceptions, there are many materials published by the governments, non-profit organizations and businesses. Although public awareness has improved continuously, there are still at least 115,472 phishing attacks worldwide in the 1st half of 2011 which is greater than 67,677 in the 2nd half of 2010 according to the latest report of Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [1] .
Due to the key role in accessing the Internet, web browsers are at a strategic position to offer the protection against the risks of phishing attacks. A recent study shows that, there are 97% of participants fell for at least one of the phishing emails and visited the malicious URLs. The indicators of the browsers present the well performance as 79% of participants who saw the active warnings used by IE chose to close the phishing websites and none of the users entered sensitive information when the Firefox2 alert users with phishing warnings [2] .
In the ordinary desktop environment, the browser-based anti-phishing scheme is realized by the integrated protection or add-ones in the form of toolbars. A variety of security companies have proposed their solutions to protect the end-use [3] . Considering the accuracy and the user experience, the most detection solutions rely on the blacklists. After the classification utilizing by a heuristic approach based on features or keywords [4, 5] and, sometimes, a human-verified [6] , the blacklist which holds URLs that covers to the malicious websites is compiled and shared. Hence, the phishing detection is simply converted to the process of list matching. In order to achieve a high efficiency warning and blocking mechanism, the list of suspended phishing websites is constantly updated. The Google has also proposed a simplified regular expression method to improve the efficiency of their clients' lookup [7] . As many technology vendors have tried to protect the users by providing antiphishing tools either integrated into browsers or as browser plug-ins, there need a series of systematic tests to estimate their performance.
In this paper, we compare the effectiveness and the accuracy of these anti-phishing tools. We use a live phishing URL feed and 3403 fresh phishing URLs to conduct four experiments on ten antiphishing tools including browsers and browser plug-ins. We believe this paper is the first research to evaluate the effectiveness of these desktop anti-phishing tools from a non-English live phishing feed. And based on these evaluations, we propose some new problems that these mechanisms must be faced, and introduce these findings for the future anti-phishing design. Specifically, this paper makes four significant contributions:
 We introduce a novel platform-independent evaluation system for automatically testing antiphishing toolbars in different desktop environments.  We construct our comprehensive experiments by utilizing larger samples, multiple phishing feeds and fresher URLs to estimate the performance and the effectiveness of the antiphishing techniques since the former researchers used only hundreds samples and very limited phishing sources.  We are the first research to test the detection capabilities and the accuracies in a nonEnglish environment and evaluate a regional browser that contains a built in anti-phishing function.  According to our experiment results, we proposed a series of discoveries that can be used in the phishing detection. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the related works and the overview of current anti-phishing techniques for detection in a desktop. In the following section, Section 3, the methodology of our evaluation is proposed. Section 4 provides the detailed results of our evaluation. Section 5 describes the discussion and our findings. And then we present our conclusions in Section 6.
Background
In this section, we describe the background of our tests. The browser-based anti-phishing schemes employ different combinations of variety detection methods like whitelist, blacklists or heuristics to identify the page that the end-user visits is whether a phishing site or not. We first utilize the public information that provided on these security products' official website or research papers to get a basic understanding of each anti-phishing tools. Then, we present the previous works related to the similar evaluations.
Overview of anti-phishing techniques
Heuristic methods based on the URLs and page contents are the most common anti-phishing techniques and, sometimes, are the major sources of the anti-phishing blacklists. Different machine learning algorithms are utilized to build classification models according to the target websites' features. For example, Ma et al. published their research on identifying phishing by examining the characteristics of the URLs alone [8, 9] . Zhang et al. proposed a content-based method using a linear classifier on eight features range from URLs based features like age of domain to HTML structure based features like whether has input forms [10] . Their system yielded an average TP of 89% and FP of 1% on 100 phishing URLs and 100 legitimate URLs. Google uses a large-scale system to maintain their phishing blacklist automatically [5] . Through a logistic regression classifier, they can distinguish whether the sites in question are phishing or not on the basis of URL, hosting information and page features. After the offline training process using features collected from 103,684 phishing URLs in 9,388,395 total URLs during 3 months which generated the classification model, the classifier maintains a false positive rate below 0.03%. Internet Explorer and Symantec Norton 360 employ the heuristic phishing detection methods in their released versions. SmartScreen, the phishing filter that proposed by the Microsoft, has been introduced in Internet Explorer 8 and 9 [11] . Besides, based on the specific characteristics, Norton 360 employs their heuristics to identify the unknown threats.
Another method and also the most popular technique is the blacklist based filtering way. Many browsers like Microsoft IE, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari have already presented their integrated blacklist-based anti-phishing solutions. Besides the heuristic methods that mentioned before, Internet Explorer has a fresh blacklist and whitelist. Norton 360 is similar. When the end-user visits any websites, the software will automatically check the site against a "block list" that is continuously updated in real time. Google published a Safe Browsing API based on its constantly-updated blacklists that generated by their large-scale classifier [5] . Both the Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox are using this source. Opera has a real time security agency. When the user visit sites on the Internet, Opera queries this data in real time to determine whether a URL needs to block.
Related work
Many previous studies have examined the accuracy and effectiveness of anti-phishing techniques for detecting in a desktop environment. Cranor et al. used 100 active, manually verified phishing URLs from phishtank.com and 510 legitimate URLs to evaluate 10 popular anti-phishing tools in Nov, 2006. They found that only two tools were able to detect over 80% of phishing URLs at hour zero. The SpoofGuard is the only one that was able to consistently identify more than 91% fraudulent sites. However, it also played with false positive rates of 38%. Others had few false positives but missed more than 15% of phishing sites [12] . This study has a very limited experimental dataset. Moreover, the freshness of their data feed is not proposed.
Ludl et al. introduced an independently and concurrently test that contains a 10,000 phishing URLs dataset to conduct the experiment of two popular anti-phishing solutions maintained by Google and Microsoft [13] . Their results suggest the blacklist-based mechanism is quite satisfactory in the phishing protection. With a similar limitation, their evaluation corpus is limited in timeliness considering the phishing sites are usually ephemeral.
A more recent study is proposed by Sheng et al. They used 191 fresh phishing URLs that were less than 30 minutes old and 13,458 legitimate URLs to examine the effectiveness of eight anti-phishing toolbars. They found that the blacklist-based protection is inadequate in the initial hours. Less than 20% of phishing URLs can be detected in the first hour. They also found the toolbars that using heuristics had a much better result at identifying unknown phishing sites. However, as they pointed out, their phishing corpus came from a single anti-spam vendor. So, other attack vectors like IM, popup windows, or SMS are not included [14] .
Methodology

Anti-phishing evaluation system
. We develop our automated evaluation system following the idea of Yue's test bed [12] . We use a similar client-and-server architecture. This architecture makes it feasible to evaluate several tools in a same time under the large data sets. Since different tools or browsers have different interfaces, it is infeasible for us to design a general plug-ins or hook to fetch the results of these tools. For us, we capture the screen and use an image compared method to collect the reactions of these security products. Figure 1 shows the architecture of our anti-phishing evaluation system that includes a serverside and a client-side. The server-side is responsible for keeping the data synchronization and each client-side is responsible for a single evaluating environment. Considering our evaluation scenario, both the server and client-side are built by Java. Since the Java programs are cross-platform, users can execute an application that implemented in Java under Windows, Linux, Mac, and so forth. In these experiments, we can freely deploy the architecture of our evaluation applications and omit the difference between operating systems.
Step1-Connect to the phishing URLs feeds.
We conducted our experiments on exhaustive datasets to exam the performance of each target. The server-side connects to our phishing URLs feeds to get the evaluation data. We offer a live phishing feed with no delay from our online detection engine. When the server-side receives a ready signal from the feed, the connection to the data source is built successfully. Step2-Wait for the connection from the client.
After the server-side successfully establishes a connection with the live feed, it listens on the specific port for the client connection requests. The client-side which is responsible for calling a single browser checks the environment variable according to the configuration file. If the file path and the browser fulfill the test requirements, the client will connect to the server-side for querying the test data. When the connections from every client are completed, the evaluation will begin. Step3-Execute visiting phishing URLs and capture the reaction of anti-phishing tools.
In this step, every client-side calls the browser to visit the specified websites after receiving the test URLs which sent by the server-side at the same time. Each client-side is running a separate browser to simulate the real environment. And we conduct our evaluation on multiple independent desktop environments using physical computers and virtual machines. Since every tool has the known warning states like a red icon when the URL that user visited is labeled as a phishing, and since each tool has a known location in the bowser, it is feasible for us to capture the specific positions of the screens and recorded these screenshots as the reactions.
Step4-Compare the captured images and collect the results.
After storing these captured screenshots, we deployed an image comparison method to calculate the similarities between the known reactions that captured beforehand and the screenshots of the current state. Here we utilize the locality sensitive hashing [15] algorithm to realize the function of image file comparison.
Phishing URLs Feeds
For our experiment, multiple feeds were employed to overcome the limitation of former research [14] like single feed vendor or single attack vector. We obtained the phishing URLs from Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) and Anti-Phishing Alliance of China (APAC). APWG is a non-profit international organization that provides phishing URLs for their members to eliminate the fraud or crime that result from phishing and APAC mainly focus the Chinesetarget phishing. According to the APWG's report, there are only about 20 percent of the phishing attacks that reported by APAC can be detected by the APWG. Hence the phishing URLs from these two feeds contain different regional information and the Chinese-target phishing URLs are first brought into the evaluation. These URLs are valuable for us to evaluate the detection capabilities of the target anti-phishing tools.
Besides, we have a real-time data feed from Huawei Symantec Anti-phishing Lab (HSAPL). HSAPL has multiple detection nodes located in various regions like Asia, Europe and North America. Their detection engines in these nodes examine every URL that retrieved from HTTP streams and output the phishing URLs in real time. Our test platform received these URLs as soon as the results were recorded in their repository and sent them to the test client with no time delay to keep the URLs fresh.
Experimental setup
We selected the 6 most popular integrated browsers which are Internet Explorer 8(8.0.6001.18702), Internet Explorer 9(9.0.8112.16421), Mozilla Firefox (4.0.1), Google Chrome (11.0.696.77), Safari (5.0.5), and Opera (11.11).We also introduced the Qihoo 360 Secure Browser (3.7.1.2) into our experiments since it was described as the most popular and safest web browser in Chinese market. Moreover we picked 4 of the most representative anti-phishing tools which are CallingID (1.8.1.32), Norton Safe Web (1.1), Netcraft Anti-Phishing Toolbar (1.4.5.3). Using Chrome, we tested CallingID.
Using Firefox, we tested Norton Safe Web and Netcraft. Since the Spoofguard is only valid under the IE6 and has no longer been supported, we thus did not select it as our evaluation target.
The server-side was run on Intel Core 2 E5400 Lenovo ThinkCentre with 4GB RAM and 320GB hard disk. We configure each client on separate VMware to ensure that only one anti-phishing product loaded on one virtual machine during the test. In order to avoid the network latency, both the server and client side are in the same subnet. Before each test, we left every products open for 1 day to update their local blacklists. Since some of these tools may have big repositories or the update connections have unsatisfactory reliability, one day is necessary for the downloading blacklists. Moreover, we reconfigured every candidate's settings to ensure that the test would not to be disturbed by popup windows or multimedia files.
We ran our test on Sep 16, 19 and 22, 2011 and on Nov 14, 15 and 25, 2011. The evaluation system began the evaluating as soon as it received the phishing URL. During the test, we totally collected and tested 1146 verified phishing URLs from APWG, 930 phishing URLs from APAC and 1327 phishing URLs from HSAPL. After finishing the evaluation process, we manually verified every URL that the target tools labeled as safe. That is, in order to get more accurate results, we have to ignore some mislabeled URLs since some of them in our phishing feeds may have been taken down and replaced with 404 pages or redirected to a legitimated websites.
Evaluation
Coverage Evaluation
We first construct an experiment to examine the phishing coverage of each target. We tested 394 URLs from APWG and 302 URLs from APAC on two time points which are September 16 and 19, 2011. Each client called the browsers to open up them with the target tools for 30 seconds before the screenshots. And we recorded the results of every target products and presented them in Figure 2 . We found that all the tools performed better and detected more phishing URLs when the time passed by. Firefox (FF) utilized the same phishing blacklists supported by the Google. The same results from Chrome and FF in Figure 2 demonstrated that. Similarly, Internet Explorer 8 (IE8) and 9 (IE9) also shared a blacklist. In our first experiment, Chrome and FF played the best that they recognized more than 40% of APWG's phishing in the first time period and nearly 70% in the second. Besides, Qihoo 360 Secure Explorer (360se) detected more than 60% of APAC's phishing URLs while others only caught less than 30% in the beginning and no more than 50% after two days later. Opera, IE 8 and 9 were ineffective no matter the phishing attacks were from APWG or APAC especially the IE under the attack of the Chinese-target phishing. Different from the browsers and toolbars that have binary results, CallingID, Norton and Netcraft have different types of indicators. That is a site can be a phishing, safety or may be a phishing and unknown. Some risk rating system like Netcraft will give the ratio of the probability of whether a target URL is phishing or not. Hence, we recorded these reactions during the evaluation and listed in Table 1 .
If we considered the Warning and Caution as the danger, we found that CallingID was the most effective which identified more than 19% APWG, 8% APAC records in the beginning and 30% APWG, 24% APAC records after two days. However, the false negative was a little higher than others. 
Tendency Evaluation
Our first experiments evaluated the target tools on two time points. We had to track data changes over time to demonstrate the detail performance of all our evaluation targets. Moreover, we utilize these experiments to verify the outcomes and conclusions of our first test. As mentioned above, since not the entire target anti-phishing tools have the same notification methods, we need to quantify the measurement criteria. Here we consider the Warning and Caution status of CallingID, Norton Safe Web and Netcraft as positive reaction. The Unknown, Safety and other intermediate state were classified as negative. Since the phishing site have a very short lifetime, five round test in 12 hours is sufficient. As shown in Figure 3 , the results had similar trends both in APWG and APAC. That is, IE8 and IE9 may have a same blacklist while Chrome and FF displayed the same performance. Chrome and FF on APWG still showed satisfying detection rates. In the APAC test, Chrome and FF recognized 15.1% of phishing sites initially. After 8 hours, they caught 48% of phishing URLs and nearly 51% at hour 12. One notable anti-phishing tool is the 360se. In hour 0, the browser 360se classified nearly 10% phishing which is as much as the others. However, it recognized 53.5% of phishing URLs after 2 hours later, 3 times more than Chrome and FF which are the best in the rest of the targets. One reason for this improvement could be that, 360se, as a local browser in China, were able to acquire more Chinese-target phishing sources than other tools. It is also possible that, their detection server obtained these URLs through the browser and accurately identified by their heuristics then pushed the results to their client as a form of blacklists. The CallingID and Opera displayed correlated performance. The percentage of recognized phishing URLs were similar. This suggests that CallingID and Opera's data sources may have overlapping with the APWG.
False Positive Evaluation
For the security software vendors, false alarms are serious mistakes. Wrongly blocking an authorized website may interrupt the users' normal activities or even lead to the commercial disputes. Here for our false positive evaluation, we collected 1000 legitimate URLs by visiting a random URL generator of Yahoo's directory which the link is http://random.yahoo.com/bin/ryl. From the tested 10 products, we did not find and any false alarms. It is very similar with the previous studies like [12] and [14] .
However, during our daily monitoring of phishing sites, we found the Google's blacklist had a large number of false positives and lasted for many days. And these mistaken records lasted from the end of August to early October. The false alarm is caused by a domain from SINA Corporation in China which is http://h2w.iask.cn. This URL provides a convert service supported by SINA that changes the HTML to WML for the mobile readers. We assumed that the phishers may use this service to launch an attack to the mobile users and detected by the Google's anti-phishing engines. Or Google's engines found a URL had a similar page with a legitimated website which in actually is a user converted this authentic page by this service. Whatever the reason is, Google had collected enough false URLs. Since Google has a URL compress method to keep their blacklists' size, they combined many stings into one hash record [6] . That is, following by the lookup requirements, the URL will be marked as a phishing if the strings have the h2w.iask.cn domain. We immediately test part of these tools to find out the impact of these false alarms. Fortunately, the influence is not so significant since this service is mainly used in the mobile phone and the microbrowsers generally do not have the anti-phishing function. Moreover, this service is used only in China.
Real-Time Evaluation
Finally, we examined the target tools by the URLs from HSAPL. By using the same procedure and the same test platform as was used before, we conducted our test with 677 URLs on September 22, 2011 and 650 URLs on November 25, 2011. Figure 4 details the results. We found that the Chrome, Firefox, Safari and CallingID played better performance than the others did. Since many records from HSAPL are the Chinese-target phishing and Qihoo 360 Secure Explorer is mainly focused to block Chinese phishing sites, it reached a satisfactory accuracy. Internet Explorer, Opera, Norton and Netcraft caught not to many records. The reason of these differences is that the vendors have their mainly targeted market, so their phishing sources caused these differences in the distinct regions. 
Discussion
Google's False Positive: As we mentioned before, Google had a serious false positive problem that incorrectly labeled many legitimate URLs from a covert service. Although the impact of this accident is limited, we cannot uncover other potential problems or affirm that similar problems will not happen again since the records of the Google's blacklist is hashed and compressed. Nevertheless, what we can confirm is that this accident will not be the last one and Google is definitely not the only one. The Google's false alarm demonstrates the complexity of the anti-phishing task. Just analyze the page is not enough for the accurate detections. A comprehensive detection algorithm should consider each aspect of the phishing website not only the page information, also the lexical relations of the URLs. Region Problems: From our evaluation, we found that the phishing attacks had close relationships with the regions. The distribution of features that used for the heuristics detection algorithms is quite different between regions. However, the existing anti-phishing techniques only considered their local conditions, and that is the reason why their products displayed distinct reactions and recognition rates in our experiments. A proper detection strategy should also fully consider the differences between regions. Semi-Phishing: As we mentioned in the section 3.3, we manually vetted every URL that has been marked as legitimate to avoid the inaccurate false negatives. During this rechecking process, we found many websites were not easy to classify. These sites do not have the obvious attacking traces and just have money or passwords related topics. We called this kind of website "semi-phishing". The contents of the semi-phishing mainly focus on tickets, top-up service, cargo service and lottery. People cannot assert whether these websites is phishing or not just according to their contents. Hence, most security vendors treated them as non-phishing to keep their low-level false alarms. In order to provide sufficient protections for the end-users, an effective warning method should not only indicate the target site is phishing or non-phishing, but also give adequate warnings to users if the website is highly suspicious.
Conclusion
In this paper, we assessed the effectiveness and the accuracy of ten popular anti-phishing tools by 3403 fresh phishing URLs. In order to realize the automated evaluation for this labor-intensive task, we presented the design of our novel cross-platform evaluation system. After a series of experiments, we found that two of the ten tools, the Chrome and Firefox, displayed a satisfactory result under all of our test data, but these two browsers still missed more than 20% malicious URLs. Qihoo 360 Secure Explorer did a strong performance under the APAC dataset that demonstrate their excellent abilities of the Chinese-target phishing detection. By comparing with the results between our four types of experiments, we also found that different tools have totally different reactions between regions. And we concluded there is no browser can detect all kinds of phishing in different languages. Finally, we proposed our advices and suggestions for designing a comprehensive anti-phishing mechanism. In the future, we plan to further develop our phishing detection system followed by these instructions.
